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1 Introduction
China’s economy seems to be upgrading rapidly. Where fifteen years ago
China was primarily an exporter of low-tech products such as apparel, toys
and footwear, today it has become the world’s largest exporter of electronics
products (OECD, 2005). This has caused concern in the West that China
is rapidly moving up the technology ladder and becoming increasingly com-
petitive in areas of comparative advantage for Western economies.
A number of recent studies have used trade data to show that China in-
deed has become more sophisticated than one would expect given its level of
development. Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann et al. (2007) develop a method-
ology to assess a country’s position on the technology ladder by analyzing
the composition of its export bundle.1 They posit that an export good is
more sophisticated the higher the weighted average income of its export-
ing countries. This permits a ranking of export products according to their
“implied productivity.” They then use each country’s export composition to
estimate the degree of sophistication of its export bundle vis-a`-vis the rest of
the world. Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann et al. (2007) find that the bundle
of goods that China exports is similar in sophistication to exports of coun-
tries with income levels three times higher than that of China, thus leading
Rodrik (2006) to conclude that “China has somehow managed to latch on to
advanced, high productivity products that one would not normally expect
a poor, labor abundant country like China to produce, let alone export.”
Using a similar logic, Schott (2006) has recently used Finger and Kreinin’s
(1979) export similarity index to demonstrate that China’s exports are sur-
prisingly similar to the export structure of OECD countries. This has led
Schott (2006) to conclude that “China’s export bundle increasingly overlaps
with that of more developed countries, rendering it more sophisticated than
countries with similar endowments.”
The main shortcoming of these studies is that trade patterns can be a
poor indicator of a country’s set of comparative advantage goods (Baldone et
al., 2006; Van Assche, 2006). International trade data are generally collected
and reported as gross flows rather than as foreign value added, making it
difficult to attribute the type of production activities that have taken place
in an exporting country (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006). Indeed, in
a world with international production fragmentation and intermediate good
trade, a country’s exports do not necessarily reflect the embodied technol-
ogy and relative endowments that have gone into the country’s domestic
1Lall et al. (2006) have developed a similar approach, but did not focus on China.
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production activities, but may simply reflect the technology and factors of
the countries from which it imports intermediate goods. To illustrate this,
consider an export good z that is produced through the assembly of inputs
x and y. In Figure 1, we depict two scenarios. In Scenario 1, the production
of the inputs x and y and the assembly of product z all occur at home. In
Scenario 2, the inputs x and y are imported from abroad, while only the
assembly occurs at home. Although the amount and type of production
activities differ in the two scenarios, the export pattern is identical. This
implies that export data will overestimate a country’s production activities
in industries with a large share of processing trade.2
Two features of China’s export system suggest that its estimated so-
phistication level is likely to be biased upward more than other countries.
First, China’s foreign trade expansion in the last few decades is mainly due
to a rise in processing exports. In 1986, processing exports accounted for
only 18 percent of China’s total exports, while by 2005 they had risen to
more than 55 percent (Naughton, 2007). Second, the share of processing
exports in total exports has consistently been higher in high-tech industries
such as electronics than more traditional industries such as textiles, leather
and shoes (Gaulier et al., 2005). These two characteristics suggest that
the existing literature’s result that China’s export bundle is relatively more
sophisticated than one would expect from the country’s level of economic
development might be a statistical mirage.
In this paper, we provide an alternative estimate of China’s position on
the global technology ladder by making use of a unique data set of world
electronics production compiled by Reed Electronics Research.3 Contrary
to existing studies, we find no evidence that China’s electronics production
activities are more sophisticated than one would expect from its level of
development. We also find little evidence that China is rapidly upgrading
into more sophisticated production activities.
2Processing trade encompasses imports of goods to be assembled or transformed in
China and re-exported, within international assembly and subcontracting operations.
These imported inputs are exempted from tariffs.
3Production data could be subject to the same difficulty in identifying value added as
opposed to the value of gross sales, which could in some cases, “amount to little more
than assembly of imported piece-parts and sub-assemblies.” The problem is likely smaller
than for export values, however, since goods are counted in production only when “value
is added in the assembly process and the finished article can be classified under a different
SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) from those of its components.” (Reed Electronics
Research, 2007.)
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2 Data and Methods
The Reed Electronics Production Data Set (REP) measures a country’s
domestic production by electronics subcategories for 51 countries. The cov-
erage and degree of disaggregation in the REP varies between countries, but
we have been able to extract a consistent panel for 13 electronics subcate-
gories from 1992 to 2005 (See Table 1 for the list of product subcategories).
The subcategories range from computers and peripherals to medical equip-
ment, audio and video equipment, semiconductor parts, and even electronic
clocks and watches.
[Table 1 about here]
In Table 2, we present summary statistics from the REP data set. The
table clearly identifies the emergence of China (and the rest of developing
East Asia) as a dominant player in the global electronics industry. China’s
electronics production has grown at a remarkable rate of 24.8 percent be-
tween 1992 and 2005. As a result, China’s share of world electronics pro-
duction has risen from 1.9 percent in 1992 to 18.4 percent in 2005. With
a value of production of 260.1 billion U.S. dollars, it has surpassed that of
the European Union and Japan, just lagging behind the U.S. electronics
production value.
[Table 2 about here]
The rapid rise in China’s share of global electronics production, however,
does not necessarily mean that China is upgrading technologically. The elec-
tronics sector is a highly heterogeneous industry that consists of production
activities that vary greatly in their sophistication levels. If China is primar-
ily specialized in production activities with low sophistication levels, then
China’s rise in the global electronics industry does not necessarily go hand-
in-hand with technological upgrading. To analyze China’s position on the
global technological ladder, it is therefore necessary to take into account the
composition of production activities that take place within its electronics
industry.
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Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indices are often used to mea-
sure patterns of specialization in trade.4 We can compute a similar index
to measure patterns of production specialization. Let xi,c denote the pro-
duction value of electronics subcategory i in country c, then Xc =
∑
i xi,c
equals country c’s total electronics production value. Then the production
intensity index (PII) is given by:
PIIi,c = (
xi,c
Xc
)/(
∑
c xi,c∑
c Xc
). (1)
Values greater than one indicate that the country has a greater share of its
electronics production in the product subcategory than world producers as
a whole.
Table 3 presents the production intensity indices based on production
data for each electronics subcategory for China, the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), the Newly Industrialized Economies
(NIEs: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), Japan, the United
States and the EU-15. Average indices are reported for both the 1992–1994
and 2003–2005 periods. The production specialization patterns vary greatly
across countries. In 2003–2005, for example, China was particularly special-
ized in the electronics sub-categories audio equipment, electronic data pro-
cessing (EDP), other components and video equipment. The United States,
on the other hand, was specialized in the production of very different sub-
categories including x-ray & medical equipment, control and instrumenta-
tion, office equipment and radio communications & radar.
[Table 3 about here]
Even if China begins at a lower echelon of the global technological ladder,
it can upgrade by gradually specializing in more sophisticated production
activities. And in fact, a comparison of China’s production intensity indices
for 1992–1994 and 2003–2005 shows that China’s specialization pattern has
changed over the past two decades. Specifically, its electronics industry has
4The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index (Balassa 1965), a measure of trade
specialization, is generally calculated as a country c’s share of world exports of a good i
divided by its share of total world exports: RCA = (
exi,c
EXc
)/(
∑
c exi,c∑
c EXc
). Values greater than
one indicate that the country has a greater share of its exports in the product category
than world exporters as a whole. In this paper, we use the same methodology, but use
production data instead of export data.
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become more specialized in sub-categories electronic data processing and
radio communications & radar, while becoming less specialized in personal
consumer electronics and audio equipment among others (see Table 3).
To estimate China’s position on the technology ladder as well as its up-
grading trajectory in the electronics industry, we use a methodology similar
to Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann et al. (2006). In a first step, we esti-
mate the level of technological sophistication of a product as the weighted-
average income of its producers. The rationale behind this is that, in the
absence of trade interventions, richer countries generally will have charac-
teristics that provide a comparative advantage in more-advanced industries.
These characteristics may include high capital abundance, the embodiment
of higher-level technology and better institutions. Let Yc represent coun-
try c’s per-capita GDP in current prices, with the other symbols as defined
above. Then the level of product sophistication S for good i is given by
Si =
∑
c
xi,c/Xc∑
c (xi,c/Xc)
Yc. (2)
The numerator of the weighting expression is the share of product i in overall
production for a country. The denominator gives the sum of these shares
across all countries. Therefore, the index is a weighted average of national
incomes, where the weights reflect patterns of relative specialization in that
good. It is straightforward to rearrange equation (2) so that a country’s
weight is a function of all countries’ production intensity indices:
Si =
∑
c
ωi,cYc (3)
where
ωi,c =
PIIi,c∑
c PIIi,c
.
The value of sophistication index, Si, summarizes the average income
of countries specialized in the production of good i. Note that there are
two reasons why a good’s sophistication index may increase. First, it may
increase because rich countries increase their specialization in the production
of good i. Second, it may increase because the countries that are specialized
in good i get relatively richer than the rest of the world.
Once the sophistication index has been estimated for all goods i, one can
calculate a country’s technology index CTI as the weighted average of the
sophistication levels of the products that it produces:
CTIc =
∑
i
θi,cSi. (4)
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where a product’s weight θi,c equals the share of good i in country c’s total
electronics output:
θi,c =
xi,c
Xc
.
3 Results
In this Section, we present the results in three parts. In subsection 3.1, we
discuss how electronics subcategories are ranked in terms of their degree
of sophistication and how this has changed over time. In subsection 3.2,
we then analyze how China’s estimated technology index compares to other
countries. Finally, in subsection 3.3, we compare China’s technology index
to its level of development.
3.1 Product Sophistication Index
In Table 4 we present the average sophistication indices for the various
electronics subcategories in 1992–1994 and 2003–2005 respectively. We can
make a couple of observations concerning the sophistication rankings. First,
it might seem surprising that personal consumer electronics is ranked as the
most sophisticated electronics subcategory, since it primarily accounts for
items such as electronics clocks and watches. This can be explained by the
fact that the world’s richest country—Switzerland—produces almost a third
of the total value of personal consumer electronics.
Second, the ranking of electronics subcategories has remained fairly sta-
ble across time. The three most sophisticated subcategories are consistently
personal consumer electronics, x-ray & medical equipment and control &
instrumentation, while the four least sophisticated products are video equip-
ment, audio equipment, office equipment and industrial equipment.
Third, there is one electronics subcategory that has seen a dramatic
change in ranking: electronic data processing (EDP). In 1992–1994 it was
ranked as the 4th most sophisticated product, while in 2003–2005 it had
dropped to 9th place. This drop in ranking is because developed countries
in the last two decades have significantly reduced their specialization in EDP,
while developing countries have increased their specialization. Indeed, the
PII index for EDP of developing countries including China, the ASEAN-4
countries, Mexico and a number of Eastern European countries all increased
significantly between 1992 and 2005. At the same time, many EU-15 coun-
tries, Japan, the United States and Canada have reduced their specialization
in EDP. This trend can be attributed to the large-scale offshoring of EDP
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assembly plants by multinational firms to developing countries primarily in
East Asia, made possible by changes in technology and the economic envi-
ronment that facilitated the vertical fragmentation of computer production
(Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998; Bonham et al., 2006).
[Table 4 about here]
3.2 Country Technology Index
In Table 5, we present the Country Technology Index (CTI) in the global
electronics industry. A number of observations stand out. First, Switzerland
and the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden have
the highest technology indices in 2003–2005 due to their high specialization
in the most sophisticated subcategories personal consumer electronics, x-ray
& medical equipment, control & instrumentation and radio & radar com-
munications. In Switzerland, for example, almost a third of its electronics
production in 2005 was in personal consumer electronics and a quarter of its
electronics production was in control & instrumentation. Two thirds of Fin-
land’s electronics production in 2005 was in radio & radar communications,
chiefly cellular phones.
[Table 5 about here]
The very high ranking of Saudi Arabia and Puerto Rico may be surpris-
ing. For Saudi Arabia, this is due to their high specialization in radio &
radar communications and x-ray & medical equipment.5 For Puerto Rico,
this is due to the fact that 44.1 percent of its electronics production value
in 2005 was x-ray & medical equipment.
There are several countries that have made large moves up or down the
rankings since the 1992–1994 period. Finland’s move up from 15th place to
4th place in the rankings reflects a doubling of its degree of specialization in
radio communications with the cellular phone boom. Austria’s jump from
44th to 20th place reflects a shift from low-sophistication audio and video
5The fact that Saudi Arabia’s overall trade is dominated by oil exports does not affect
the present analysis, which focuses only on the country’s pattern of specialization within
the electronics sector.
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equipment to higher-sophistication areas including control and instrumenta-
tion, x-ray and medical equipment and active components and passive com-
ponents. Hong Kong’s (surprising?) drop from 9th to 26th place reflects a
rise in relative production shares for office equipment, industrial equipment
and audio equipment. In the case of Ireland, it appears that the marked
decline in ranking is associated with the drop in the estimated product so-
phistication of electronic data processing, in which Ireland is particularly
heavily specialized.
Notably, our analysis provides little evidence that China has rapidly
moved up the global technological ladder. While China was ranked 42nd in
1992–1994, it has only moved up to the 39th position in 2003–2005.
3.3 CTI vs. Level of Development
The primary question we want to address is whether the sophistication of
China’s electronics production is unusually high given its level of economic
development. As we discussed above, several authors have argued that this is
the case for overall Chinese production based on an analysis of export data.
Does this result hold up when electronics production data are considered?
The answer is a resounding “no”.
In Figure 2, we show the scatter plot of CTI against per-capita GDP in
2003–2005. Similar to the export analysis of Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann
et al. (2007), we find that there is a positive correlation (the correlation
coefficient is 0.64). Richer countries tend to have higher country technology
index values.6 However, unlike these authors, we do not find that China is a
positive outlier. Rather, we find that China lies dead on the regression line,
implying that we find no empirical evidence that China’s level of technolog-
ical sophistication in electronics is higher than one would expect for its level
of development.7
[Figure 2 about here]
6As noted by Hausmann et al. (2007), the positive relationship between CTI and per-
capita GDP is partly by construction, since a commodity’s sophistication is determined
by the per-capita income of countries that are important producers of the good. However,
this accounts for only a limited part of the positive correlation.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have made use of a unique world electronics production
data set to assess whether China’s electronics industry is more sophisticated
than one would expect from its level of development. Contrary to existing
studies, we find no evidence of this, nor do we find evidence that China is
rapidly upgrading into more sophisticated electronics production activities.
There are admittedly some strong assumptions embedded in this analysis—
assumptions common to this literature. While it is plausible that income
levels of producing countries may proxy for technology level, this is clearly
imperfect. The mapping from production location to product sophistication
is also potentially problematic. For example, whether a part is produced
locally or imported from a lower-wage country may have as much to do
with whether a final good can be easily modularized as it does with the
technological sophistication of the underlying production process (Van Ass-
che, forthcoming). It would be useful to have more sophisticated measures
of product sophistication based on factor endowments and measurable pro-
ductivity.
The idea of using income levels and specialization patterns to evalu-
ate productivity levels is an appealing one. But if one wants to take this
seriously, one must acknowledge the fundamental shortcoming of gross inter-
national trade data, which may tell us little about actual value added. Our
results based on production data for electronics provide a striking contrast
to the earlier broad trade-based results and challenge the common assertion
that China is a positive outlier in the sophistication of its production.
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Table 1: Product categories
Mnemonic Category Type of Products
EDP Electronic data processing Computers, peripherals
OFF Office equipment Photocopiers, electronic calculators
CON Control and instrumentation Measuring instruments, control systems
XME X-ray and medical equipment X-ray equipment, electromedical equipment
IND Industrial equipment Traffic signaling, security and fire alarms
COM Radio communications and radar Mobile radio telephones, pagers
TEL Telecommunications Telephones, fax, answering machines
VID Video equipment Television, video camera, DVD player
AUD Audio equipment Portable audio, car audio, CD player
PCE Personal consumer equipment Electronic clocks, electronic watches
ACT Active components Integrated circuits, diodes, transistors
PAS Passive components printed circuit boards, relays, switches
OTH Other components Microphones, loudspeakers, amplifiers
Source: Reed Yearbook of World Electronics Data
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Table 4: Product sophistication index
1992–1994 2003–2005
Index Ranking Index Ranking
PCE 17482 1 26722 1
XME 15133 2 25704 2
CON 15025 3 25388 3
COM 12791 5 21578 4
PAS 11992 8 18616 5
TEL 12343 7 18578 6
OTH 12690 6 18278 7
ACT 10740 9 17751 8
EDP 12897 4 17306 9
IND 9814 11 17046 10
OFF 10478 10 16007 11
AUD 7294 12 11150 12
VID 6952 13 8315 13
Source: Authors’ calculations using Reed Yearbook of World Electronics Data
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Figure 1: Ordinary versus processing trade.
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Table 5: Country technology index (rankings)
Rank in 2003-2005 1992-1994 1998-2000 2003-2005
Switzerland 1 1 1
Denmark 5 6 2
Norway 4 4 3
Finland 15 3 4
Sweden 7 2 8
Saudi Arabia 3 17 6
Puerto Rico 8 25 7
Netherlands 6 15 8
Germany 17 7 9
Croatia 12 11 10
Canada 11 14 11
New Zealand 2 5 12
United States 13 8 13
Ukraine 47 13 14
Australia 16 9 15
Italy 14 18 16
France 20 12 17
Israel 18 10 18
Bulgaria 28 32 19
Austria 44 36 20
United Kingdom 19 20 21
Greece 36 29 22
Slovenia 21 24 23
Venezuela 22 21 24
Romania 34 19 25
Hong Kong 9 16 26
Ireland 10 22 27
Belgium 26 37 28
South Korea 43 23 29
South Africa 33 34 30
Japan 29 28 31
Philippines 38 26 32
Taiwan 24 30 33
Singapore 27 31 34
Czech Rep. 25 33 35
Russia 41 35 36
Brazil 32 38 37
Hungary 23 46 38
China 42 40 39
Malaysia 49 41 40
Thailand 37 39 41
Slovakia 40 27 42
Spain 31 43 43
India 35 45 44
Portugal 39 49 45
Vietnam 51 48 46
Indonesia 48 44 47
Poland 30 42 48
Egypt 45 50 49
Mexico 46 47 50
Turkey 50 51 51
Source: Authors’ calculations using Reed Yearbook of World Electronics Data
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Figure 2: CTI versus GDP per capita.
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